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ABSTRACT
There is a sharp tension between the expectations that hundreds of thousands
to millions of persons have regarding their right to eventually have their student
loan debts forgiven under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, starting
this fall, and the legitimate public concerns regarding the large future costs and
regressive incidence of the PSLF program’s benefits. The Trump Administration
has recently proposed prospectively abolishing the PSLF program for future Direct
Loans. Whether or not this proposal is adopted, given the large costs of the
program (which I estimate will eventually rise to $12 billion/year or more as an
estimated 200,000 people/year or more will eventually seek debt forgiveness), and
given the skewed incidence of its benefits in favor of mid-career doctors and
lawyers, I think that there will eventually be a more aggressive push by the
Administration or members of Congress for retroactive elimination of the program,
or at least for a retroactive tax law amendment to include this forgiven debt as
taxable income under IRS Code Section 108 as is now done for debts forgiven
under the other income-based loan forgiveness plans.
As a matter of positive law this article considers several contractual
arguments as well as a couple of Constitutional arguments that opponents of such
retroactive statutes could offer. The contractual arguments include an express loan
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terms argument, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing-based
argument, a promissory estoppel argument, and an unconscionability argument.
Some of these arguments against retroactive PSLF program repeal have
considerable merit, at least for some Direct Loan borrowers who can make certain
fact-specific showings. The Constitutional arguments include the substantive due
process issue that would presented by a tax law change that would have retroactive
impacts extending back a decade or more. Opponents of such tax legislation might
be able to get some traction on the substantive due process issue under Bowen v.
POSSE (1986). They also can offer a plausible Takings Clause argument against a
tax law change if the courts take the (unlikely) step of regarding the PSLF
program’s tax exemption for forgiven debt as a contractual commitment, rather
than as only a revocable privilege.
Apart from this legal analysis the article does not take a strong normative
position on these issues. I do, however, suggest that as a matter of policy a
compromise that would arguably fairly balance the interests at issue here may be to
continue the PSLF program, but also to retroactively repeal the tax exemption for
forgiven debt so as to recapture approximately one-quarter to one-third of the
benefits of debt forgiveness, and do so in a modestly progressive manner. Such a
compromise should probably also include some provision for spreading the
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payment of those taxes over at least several years in order to avoid unduly
burdening these persons with a “tax bomb” effect.

4

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………….

II.

THE DIRECT LOAN MASTER PROMISSORY NOTE……………….

III.

THE AMOUNT OF DEBT LIKELY TO BE FORGIVEN UNDER

IV.

THE PSLF PROGRAM………………………………………………….

V.

BORROWER CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS TO INVOKE DEBT
FORGIVENESS AND TAX EXEMPTION OF FORGIVEN DEBT…..
A. The Express Contractual Terms Argument……………………….….
B. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Argument..…..
C. The Promissory Estoppel Arument……………………………………
D. The Unconscionability Argument…………………………………….

VI.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POWER TO RETROACTIVELY
LIMIT PSLF DEBT FORGIVENESS AND TAX TREATMENT
PRIVILEGES……………………………………………………………..

VII. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………
.

5

I.

INTRODUCTION
Starting in October of 2017 people are going to start qualifying for tax-

exempt forgiveness of their remaining federal Direct Loan student debt under the
Public Service Loan Forgiveness program (“PSLF program”) after 10 years of
public service employment. I estimate below in Part III of this article that
eventually 200,000 or more Direct Loan borrowers will qualify for and seek debt
forgiveness each year under this program.

But this anticipated large-scale debt forgiveness may not actually take place.
As I will estimate below in Part III the program’s annual cost to taxpayers could be
eventually grow to $12 billion to $18 billion/year, a very large sum, and its
benefits would be highly skewed in favor of mid-career doctors and lawyers with
large student loan debts. Recognizing these significant cost and distributional
concerns the Obama Administration proposed in 2016 to sharply limit the amount
of debt that could be forgiven under the program, a proposal that was not enacted
into law. The Trump Administration has now in its first budget proposal called for
prospective elimination of the PSLF program for future Direct Loans.
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Whether or not this Trump Administration proposal is adopted, given the
program’s very large projected costs and controversial distribution of benefits,
features which will become much more visible once substantial debts start being
forgiven on a large scale, there will surely be serious efforts made by the Trump
Administration (or a later Administration) or members of Congress to take even
more aggressive action and retroactively repeal the PSLF program with regard to
all persons who have not yet been granted debt forgiveness. If this occurs it will be
very disappointing if not financially devastating to the hundreds of thousands to
perhaps millions of persons who will not yet have qualified for debt forgiveness by
completing 10 years of public service, but who have relied on the availability of
eventual debt forgiveness in making their borrowing and subsequent employment
decisions.

But these people may have some legal recourse against the implementation of
such retroactive legislation if it is signed into law. There are a number of
contractual or Constitutional arguments that can be made against retroactive repeal
of the PSLF program, or against retroactive elimination of the current tax
exemption for debt forgiven under that program. This article will consider those
arguments in some detail.
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My overall conclusion is that it is unclear whether any of those arguments
against retroactive legislation would be successful. As a matter of positive law I
believe that several of the legal arguments against retroactive repeal of the PSLF
program do have considerable merit, and one or more of those arguments may be
accepted by the courts, at least for a relatively small subset of some Direct Loan
borrowers. In contrast, while several legal arguments against retroactive repeal of
the tax exemption for debt forgiven under that program can also be made, and they
are not specious arguments, they are much less convincing and are unlikely to
prevail against such a statute.

As a matter of social policy, I think that it is a close and difficult question as
to whether a retroactive repeal of the PSLF program, or a removal of the tax
exemption for debt forgiven under that program, is justified. On the one hand,
hundreds of thousands of indebted graduates over the past decade have relied, at
least in part, on the prospects of debt forgiveness after 10 years in deciding to take
these loans, and in then deciding to accept public service positions that often pay
relatively modest compensation. The PSLF program has clearly been successful in
encouraging people to choose public service careers, one of its primary objectives.
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On the other hand, as I will later demonstrate, the program will soon become very
expensive. The annual costs of this program may soon reach $12 billion to $18
billion/year, a substantial sum, and in addition the benefits of that program will be
decidedly regressive in their incidence, heavily skewed towards mid-career doctors
and lawyers.

I do not have strong views or any special insights as to how this tension
should be resolved. If one seeks a “middle ground” here to try to address these
conflicting concerns, rather than embracing one pole or the other of the debate, in
my opinion the best balance may be either a either a continuation of the program,
or instead a prospective-only repeal as suggested by the Trump Administration,
either one accompanied by a repeal of the tax exemption for forgiven debt under
this program so that approximately one-quarter to one-third or more of the benefits
of forgiveness will be immediately recaptured in federal or state income tax
revenues. These new taxes would be imposed in a somewhat progressive manner,
given the structure of marginal tax rates, and given that higher-debt borrowers will
in general have higher incomes in the year of forgiveness. This is the general
approach taken under all of the other federal income-based loan repayment
programs, with their 20- or 25-year loan repayment periods before debt forgiveness
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is granted, and with the taxation of forgiven debt recognized in the year of
forgiveness, and this approach may make sense for the PSLF program as well.

If this approach is followed, however, some provision should be made to
allow persons to pay these taxes over at least several years so as to avoid unduly
burdening these persons having debts forgiven with a “tax bomb” effect due to the
imposition of a potentially very large tax obligation without any funds being
provided to pay those taxes.
_________________________

The PLSF program2 was enacted in 2007 and went into effect on October 1
of that year.3 Under this program a person who has borrowed money for
educational purposes through a federal Direct Loan,4 and who after October 1,
2007 works for a total of 120 months (which need not be consecutive)5 in a
qualified public service job,6 and also makes regular monthly loan repayments
under a qualifying loan repayment plan,7 will at the end of that 10-year period of
qualifying employment be entitled to forgiveness of any remaining principal and
interest balance outstanding on those Direct Loans.8 Moreover, that forgiven debt
will not be regarded as taxable cancellation of indebtedness income, unlike the

10

manner in which forgiven debt is treated under the several other federal incomebased student loan repayment programs that provide for debt forgiveness.9 The
Department of Education (“DOE”) has subsequently adopted regulations
implementing the PSLF program.10

A few people may meet the 10-year employment requirement and qualify for
debt forgiveness under this program as early as October of 2017. In 2018 and
thereafter, however, the number of people qualifying for and obtaining debt
forgiveness will surely grow very substantially.11 That is, unless the Trump
Administration (or a later Administration) and Congress go beyond the
Administration’s current proposal to prospectively abolish the PSLF program and
instead enact a statute which will deny loan forgiveness not only to future
borrowers but also to those persons who have previously taken out Direct Loans
and accepted public service employment in reliance on being able to later utilize
the program’s generous debt forgiveness provisions and the accompanying tax
exemption for forgiven debt.12

The Trump Administration’s May 22, 2017 budget proposal tersely states
that “the Budget eliminates the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program,”13 but
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then later states that “All student loan proposals apply to loans originated on or
After July 1, 2018, except those provided to borrowers to finish their current
course of study.”14 This proposal therefore would apply only prospectively to
future Direct Loans taken out after that date, and would even retain PSLF program
debt forgiveness eligibility for those post-July 1, 2018 Direct Loans that were
taken out by persons completing a course of study that was commenced before that
date.15 Direct Loan borrowers would therefore continue to be eligible for PSLF
program debt forgiveness for any pre-July 1, 2018 loans (and for some post-July 1,
2018 loans) once they met the 10-year public service employment requirement.
Under this proposal the number of persons obtaining PSLF program debt
forgiveness annually, which will rise rapidly starting in 2018, would begin to
decline very rapidly after 2028, eventually dwindling to close to zero by a few
years after that date.

As I will later demonstrate in Part III of this article, however, the cost to
taxpayers of continuing to provide debt forgiveness to existing Direct Loan
borrowers under the current PSLF debt forgiveness terms, and with the current
favorable tax treatment of that forgiven debt, may quickly rise in 2018 and
afterwords to as much $12 billion to $18 billion/year. This is a much larger sum
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than most policymakers have so far expected or that the media has discussed. The
Trump Administration (or a later Administration) and Congress will surely be
strongly tempted to draft (or later amend) any statutory prospective curtailment of
the PSLF program to also retroactively apply to existing Direct Loan debts in order
to avoid a decade of such a substantial drain on the Treasury, probably totaling
well over $100 billion between 2017 and 2028.16 There will surely be strong
political resistance to adopting such a harsh retroactive measure that would take
away PSLF program debt forgiveness privileges from existing borrowers. If that
resistance proves insurmountable those persons who favor such action may decide
to instead propose a statutory change to the Internal Revenue Service Code that
would also have retroactive impacts in that the Code would then treat debt forgiven
under the PSLF program as taxable cancellation of indebtedness income, in the
same manner as will be debts forgiven under each of the several other federal
income-based student loan programs, thus recapturing approximately one-quarter
to one-third of this forgiven debt in federal or state income tax payments.17

But would a statute that goes beyond the current Trump Administration
proposal and retroactively curtails or even eliminates the PSLF program’s debt
forgiveness privileges for existing Direct Loan borrowers, or which changes the
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tax treatment of debts forgiven under this program for existing Direct Loan
borrowers, be given legal effect by the courts? Or would those debt forgiveness
and tax treatment privileges each be regarded by the courts as contractual
obligations of the federal government, and moreover as contractual obligations that
cannot not be legally abrogated by statute given Constitutional limitations? These
are the questions that I will consider in this article.

There is no provision under the PSLF program for persons to formally enroll
in the program prior to filing their application seeking debt forgiveness, and this
application cannot be filed until they can document that they have met the required
10-year period of qualifying public service employment. Moreover, the DOE has
not yet made available the application form that people will need to file, starting in
October of 2017, once those persons begin to qualify for debt forgiveness. The
DOE in 2012 did implement a voluntary certification procedure through which
prospective applicants may have annual periods of employment certified as
qualifying public service employment, prior to their later filing an application for
debt forgiveness once they have met the 10-year employment requirement.18 Over
half a million borrowers have already availed themselves of this certification
procedure even though there is no requirement that persons obtain such prior
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certification in advance of their application for debt forgiveness.19 The number of
new borrowers obtaining such certifications each year has been growing rapidly in
recent years, with 218,223 persons first receiving an employment certification in
2016,20 a sharp 52.3% increase over the 143,276 people who first did so in 2015,21
and over a 100% increase over the 108,437 people who first did so in 2014.22

The fact that people are not required to give the DOE prior notice of their
intent to utilize the PSLF program before they later seek to obtain debt forgiveness
means that any advance estimates of how many people will actually seek debt
forgiveness, and how large the amounts of debt forgiven will be, both individually
and in the aggregate, are necessarily highly speculative since at this time no one
has yet qualified to apply. As I have noted, a substantial and rapidly growing
number of borrowers have indicated their interest in the program by obtaining one
or more of the voluntary annual employment certifications,23 but this number bears
no necessary relationship to the number of people who will eventually qualify for
and apply for debt forgiveness.

The initial number of applicants for debt forgiveness in late-2017 is likely to
be quite small, only including those Direct Loan borrowers who have held
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qualifying public service employment every year since late-2007 when the PSLF
program was first adopted. But it is certain that the number of people applying for
debt forgiveness will grow rapidly in 2018 and thereafter as increasing numbers of
borrowers become more aware of the program’s generous debt forgiveness
provisions, as they surely will once it becomes widely publicized that many people
are taking great advantage of those provisions, and as they also begin to meet the
10-year public service employment period requirement. Since it has been
estimated that roughly one-quarter of all jobs qualify as public service jobs under
the PSLF program’s very broad definition,24 by the time the program reaches
roughly a “steady state” in terms of the number of people who seek debt
forgiveness each year this number could become quite large, perhaps in the
neighborhood of 200,000 people each year if not more.25 Given that many of these
people will have very substantial amounts of debt forgiven,26 in particular many
law school graduates27 and medical school graduates,28 the annual cost to the
Treasury of this program could easily grow to a multi-billion dollar sum,29 as I will
demonstrate in Part III of this article.

Increasing public attention will surely be paid to the large taxpayer costs of
the program once significant numbers of people begin to apply for and obtain
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forgiveness of six-figure debts that in some instances will exceed $200,000. The
Trump Administration’s recent proposal to prospectively abolish the PSLF
program that was noted above may not be adopted, and even if it is adopted in its
current form it will not have retroactive impacts. But whether that proposal is
adopted or rejected, in either case it is likely that in coming years, as the major
budgetary implications of forgiving this much debt become more clear, other
attempts will be made by members of Congress and/or the Trump Administration
(or a later Administration) to statutorily limit PSLF program eligibility or its
generosity in a retroactive manner, or statutorily limit or eliminate the current
exclusion of debt forgiven under this program from taxation.

As greater public attention is paid to the PSLF program there may also be
calls made for its elimination, or at least its curtailment or substantial modification,
based not upon its overall costs but instead upon the skewed and regressive manner
in which its benefits will be conferred. A typical undergraduate borrower who
leaves school with a $30,000 Direct Loan debt, and who then takes a public service
job of the nature and compensation level usually available to a person with only an
undergraduate degree, and who then enrolls in the popular Pay As You Earn
(“PAYE”) income-based loan repayment plan, will have on the order of $25,000 or
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so of remaining debt to be forgiven after 10 years of public service employment.30
For such a borrower the annualized value of the eventual debt forgiveness is
approximately equal to an additional $2,642/year in before-tax income for that 10
year period.31 This benefit provides a significant though modest inducement to
enter public service that is approximately equivalent to roughly 6% of additional
salary, each year for 10 years, over the average initial public service compensation
for persons with only undergraduate degrees.32

In sharp contrast, a typical law school graduate who leaves school with a
now-common combined undergraduate and law school Direct Loan debt of
$150,000, and who then enrolls in the PAYE plan and takes a public service
position of the sort and compensation level open to recent law school graduates,
will experience pronounced negative amortization of his loan debt during the next
10 years and will likely eventually have as much or more than $200,000 of debt
forgiven, almost an order of magnitude more forgiven debt than will have the
typical undergraduate borrower.33 Having $200,000 of debt forgiven after 10 years
is approximately equivalent to receiving an additional $21,142/year in before-tax
income each year for that 10-year period,34 providing a much stronger inducement
to enter public service that is approximately equivalent to 38% of additional salary,
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each year over 10 years, over the average initial public service compensation for
law graduates each year.35 A typical medical school graduate who also graduates
with a $150,000 loan debt, and who as is common then spends the next seven years
in modestly paid residencies and internships before taking a public service position
as a fully licensed doctor, will also experience pronounced negative amortization
for most of the 10 years of public service, and will also have on the order of
$200,000 of debt forgiven.36 This is again a benefit roughly equal to $21,142/year
in additional before-tax compensation each year for 10 years. The PSLF program
has already come under harsh criticism for this regressive distributional feature and
for distorting borrowing incentives even though no debts have yet been forgiven.37

The PSLF program could without question be prospectively limited or even
terminated by statute with regard to those persons who have not yet taken out any
Direct Loans at the time of legislative amendment, as the current Trump
Administration proposal calls for. Those persons who have not yet executed any
Direct Loan contracts at the time of a statutory amendment that curtailed PSLF
program debt forgiveness rights would clearly not be able to utilize the program to
obtain forgiveness of later Direct Loan obligations beyond what forgiveness was
permitted by that amendment, if any. Nor would those persons who had previously
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taken out Direct Loans have a right to insist upon taking advantage of the preamendment PSLF program terms for any new Direct Loans that they may take out
after such an amendment.

The more difficult question that I would like to consider in this article is
whether such statutory PSLF program limitations or abolition, or tax law changes
limiting or removing the exemption of forgiven debt from income, could also be
retroactively imposed upon those persons who have not yet filed an application for
PSLF program debt forgiveness after 10 years of qualifying public service
employment, but whose loan documentation for at least one of their post-October
1, 2007 Direct Loans was executed prior to the effective date of that new
legislation, given that this loan documentation includes references to the PSLF
program as a debt forgiveness option that they will have at that time.38

Answering this question will require two difficult determinations. First of
all, do Direct Loan borrowers have contractual rights under their loan agreements
to utilize the current PSLF program debt forgiveness terms and the current
favorable tax treatment of that forgiven debt for the loans they have taken out prior
to any later legislative amendments that would change those terms? Second, if
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they do have those contractual rights to debt forgiveness and favorable tax
treatment of forgiven debt, is the federal government Constitutionally permitted to
retroactively abrogate those contractual rights through legislative amendments
without providing compensation to those borrowers?

As to the first of these questions, the question as to whether Direct Loan
borrowers have contractual rights both to utilize the current PSLF program debt
forgiveness terms and to have forgiven debt receive the current favorable tax
treatment, I will consider several related legal theories. One or more of these
theories may adequately support a claim made by at least some of those persons
who have taken out at least one post-October 1, 2007 Direct Loan to finance their
education, prior to the effective date of any new legislation limiting or eliminating
the PSLF program or altering the current favorable tax treatment of debts that will
be forgiven under that program, that they have a contractual right to debt
forgiveness in accordance with the PSLF program terms, and if so perhaps also a
contractual right to invoke the tax laws that were in force at the time that they took
out their loan, at least for those post-October 1, 2007 Direct Loans taken out prior
to the effective date of any legislation that may abrogate one or both of those rights
for future loans. As to the second of these questions, assuming for the sake of
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argument that the Direct Loan agreements do establish one or both of these
borrower contractual rights under one or more legal theories, I will then consider
whether the federal government has the power to legislatively abrogate one or both
of those rights without providing compensation.

The central loan document executed by borrowers under the federal Direct
Loan program is titled the “Master Promissory Note, Direct Subsidized Loans and
Direct Unsubsidized Loans, William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program”39
(“MPN”). That document provides the basis for each of four separate legal
theories that I will consider as to why the execution of this document by a
borrower creates a contractual obligation on the part of the government to provide
that borrower with current PSLF program debt forgiveness rights, and perhaps also
the right to current tax law treatment.

The first legal theory that I will consider will be the argument that the
federal government, by making a Direct Loan to a borrower using loan
documentation that refers to the PSLF program in the way that the MPN used since
October 1, 2007 does, expressly provides that borrower with a contractual right to
utilize the existing PSLF program debt forgiveness terms, and also to utilize the

22

current exemption from taxation provided for debts forgiven through this
program.40 This will be argued to be the case even if the PSLF program is later
legislatively altered in some fashion, and the loan documentation accordingly
revised, with regard to future Direct Loans taken out by that borrower or by future
borrowers, or if the relevant debt forgiveness-related tax laws are later changed.

The second and related theory that I will consider is the argument that even
if the Direct Loan MPN documentation executed for post-October 1, 2007 loans is
interpreted to not expressly provide borrowers with the contractual right to later
invoke the PSLF program debt forgiveness terms and tax laws that existed at the
time that they took out their loans, those borrowers under accepted contract law
principles will still have an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
included as part of their loan contracts. This implied covenant will arguably
protect their reasonable expectations of being able to invoke those PSLF program
debt forgiveness terms and the tax exemption for forgiven debt stemming from
those Direct Loans taken out before any later legislative abridgement of those
rights has become effective and embodied in a revised MPN.

The third argument that I will examine will be the theory that even if those
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post-October 1, 2007 Direct Loan borrowers do not have a right, under either the
express contractual terms of the MPN or under the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, to avail themselves of the PSLF program debt forgiveness terms
that existed when they took out their loans if the program is later legislatively
altered so as to terminate those debt forgiveness privileges, or to avail themselves
of the current favorable tax treatment of forgiven debt if the IRS Code is later
altered so as to eliminate the exemption of forgiven debt from taxation, they
nevertheless do have a right to insist upon those favorable debt forgiveness and tax
treatment terms under the expansive and widely embraced promissory estoppel
theory of contractual liability, based upon the forseeable reliance of those
borrowers upon the terms of their loan agreements.

Finally, I will consider the argument that even if the MPN’s express and
implied terms are interpreted to retroactively subject Direct Loan borrowers to
later-enacted legislative changes in the PSLF program, or in the applicable tax
laws, and if any promissory estoppel arguments limiting the government’s rights to
impose those changes are also rejected, those MPN terms that allow such unilateral
imposition of harsher repayment terms or tax treatment are unconscionable and
should therefore be excised from the loan agreements, thus creating contractual
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rights for pre-legislation borrowers that might protect them from these legislative
changes.

Having examined these different theories as to why Direct Loans may create
borrower contractual rights to PSLF program debt forgiveness and favorable tax
treatment, I will then turn to consider the merits of the arguments that the federal
government might offer as to why they should under the Constitution be permitted
to retroactively abolish the PSLF program, or to terminate the favorable tax
treatment of debts forgiven under that program, without providing compensation,
even if those borrowers are determined to have these contractual rights, and
especially if they do not have such contractual rights.

This article focuses solely upon the circumstances of post-October 1, 2007
Direct Loan borrowers with regard to subsequent statutory amendments that
purport to retroactively curtail their PSLF program debt forgiveness privilege or
the tax law treatment debt so forgiven. I will not consider in this article possible
attempts by the DOE to impose tighter limits on PSLF program eligibility by
adopting more restrictive new regulations that would narrow the scope of eligible
public service employment under the existing statutes, rather than by statutory
amendment. I will also not consider in this article possible DOE actions that
25

would attempt to limit program eligibility through embracing a more restrictive
interpretation of the current eligibility regulations. Some recent DOE actions of
this latter nature were taken in 2016 by the Obama Administration, and are
currently being challenged in court by the American Bar Association,41 and I am
examining the merits of these challenges in a separate article.42

I will present in Part II of this article the text of the relevant PSLF programrelated language that has been included since October 1, 2007 in the MPN for
Direct Loan transactions. In Part III I will explain why it is not yet possible to
offer with confidence precise estimates of the individual and aggregate amounts of
loan debt that may possibly be forgiven under this program over the coming
decades. I will also, however, conduct a realistic hypothetical calculation based on
the best data available that will strongly suggest that the amount of debt forgiven
under the PSLF program will eventually grow to as much as $12 billion per year,
and perhaps to as much as $18 billion/year, imposing very substantial costs upon
taxpayers. I will then discuss in Part IV each of these several contractual theories
that I have noted above that could be invoked by Direct Loan borrowers, on the
basis of the current MPN language and on the basis of various theories of
contractual liability, in an attempt to establish that they have a contractual right to
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later utilize the current PSLF program debt forgiveness terms, and to have any debt
later forgiven given the currently favorable tax treatment.

In Part V I will first consider the legality of the retroactive abolition of the
PSLF program, and of the retroactive repeal tax exemption for any debt forgiven
under this program, if Direct Loan borrower are determined to not have contractual
rights to debt forgiveness and favorable tax treatment. I will then consider in Part
V the legality of the imposition of retroactive legislation under the assumption that
Direct Loan borrowers do have contractual rights to PSLF program debt
forgiveness and the current favorable tax treatment of debt so forgiven under one
or another of the contractual theories I have set forth. I will here assess the
arguments that can be offered for and against the federal government having the
right to retroactively abrogate this contractual right to debt forgiveness, and/or the
contractual right to have forgiven debt exempt from taxation, without providing
compensation to affected borrowers.. Part VI of the article will present my overall
conclusions.

Let me very briefly summarize at the outset these conclusions. First of all,
as a matter of positive law I believe that the express language of the MPN is most
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reasonably read as not creating contractual rights for Direct Loan borrowers to
later avail themselves of the current PSLF program debt forgiveness privileges, nor
as creating a contractual right that any debt so forgiven receive the current
favorable tax treatment. That being said, however, the argument that those
borrowers have such contractual rights on the basis of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is very plausible, at least for those few borrowers who
can demonstrate that they had a reasonable expectation at the time they took out
their loan that they would have such rights. In addition, the related but distinct
argument that the government should be contractually bound by promissory
estoppel principles to honor those debt forgiveness and tax treatment rights also
has some force, again at least with regard to those few borrowers who can
demonstrate that they actually relied upon later having those rights at the time
when they entered into their loan agreements, or when they later accepted public
service employment, although there are some strong counter-arguments against the
application of promissory estoppel principles here to create such contractual rights.
Finally, a robust unconscionability challenge can be mounted against enforcement
of those MPN terms that make this debt forgiveness and favorable tax treatment
only a privilege rather than a contractual right by subjecting those privileges to
retroactive alteration by later-adopted statutes, at least with regard to those high-
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debt borrowers who were unaware of or who did not understand this conditional
language, and who would be severely impacted by the loss or substantial
curtailment of their debt forgiveness rights or their favorable tax treatment.

If it is determined that Direct Loan borrower do not have these two
contractual rights than my conclusion is that the government would be permitted to
retroactively abolish the PSLF program, mooting the issue of the permissibility of
retroactively abolishing the tax exemption.43 If one assumes for the sake of
argument, however, that borrower contractual rights to current PSLF program debt
forgiveness and the current tax treatment of forgiven debt can be justified by one
or more of the above legal theories, that then raises the difficult question as to
whether the federal government has the power to retroactively abrogate one or both
of those contractual rights by statute without providing compensation to those
borrowers adversely impacted. I have concluded that these contractual rights, if
they exist, should be regarded as “property” that is protected by the Takings Clause
of the Constitution against statutory curtailment or elimination without payment of
compensation.

As a matter of policy, while I recognize that there is a sharp tension between
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the expectations of many current Direct Loan borrowers employed in public
service that they will eventually be able to obtain debt forgiveness with favorable
tax treatment under the PSLF program, and the legitimate public concerns that
have been expressed regarding the excessive costs and regressive incidence of the
debt forgiveness benefits of the program, I do not have strong feelings or any
special insights as to how this tension should be resolved. I would suggest for
discussion one compromise resolution; continuing the program’s debt forgiveness
benefits but adopting a statute which retroactively treats debt forgiven under the
PSLF program as taxable income, as is now done for the other federal incomebased loan repayment programs. There are of course other resolutions possible
that might better balance these interests. The sooner that these questions are
resolved, the better for all concerned.
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II.

THE DIRECT LOAN MASTER PROMISSORY NOTE
The following six provisions of the current MPN document for Direct Loans

each explicitly or implicitly refer to the PSLF program and are therefore relevant
for the subsequent analysis of whether vested contractual rights to debt forgiveness
and tax exemption under the current terms of the PSLF program and the IRS Code
are created by execution by the borrower of that MPN.44
1) On page 2 of the MPN:
“GOVERNING LAW
The terms of this Master Promissory Note (MPN) will be interpreted in accordance
with the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (the HEA) (20 U.S.C. 1070 et
seq.), the U.S. Department of Education's (ED's) regulations, any amendments to
the HEA and the regulations in accordance with the effective date of those
amendments, and other applicable federal laws and regulations. Throughout this
MPN, we refer to these laws and regulations collectively as the ‘Act.’”
2) On page 2 of the MPN:
“REPAYMENT
You must repay the full amount of the loans made under this MPN, plus accrued
interest.”
3) On page 3 of the MPN:
“William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program
Direct Subsidized Loan and Direct Unsubsidized Loan Borrower's Rights and
Responsibilities Statement
IMPORTANT NOTICE

31

This Borrower's Rights and Responsibilities Statement provides additional
information about the terms and conditions of the loans you receive under the
accompanying Master Promissory Note (MPN) for Direct Subsidized Loans and
Direct Unsubsidized Loans.”
4) On page 4 of the MPN:
“LAWS THAT APPLY TO THIS MPN
The terms and conditions of loans made under this MPN are determined by the
HEA and other applicable federal laws and regulations. These laws and regulations
are referred to as "the Act" throughout this Borrower's Rights and Responsibilities
Statement.
…
NOTE: Any amendment to the Act that affects the terms of this MPN will be
applied to your loans in accordance with the effective date of the
amendment.”
5) On page 8 of the MPN:
“DISCHARGE (HAVING YOUR LOAN FORGIVEN)
…
Public Service Loan Forgiveness
A Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program is also available. Under this
program, we will forgive the remaining balance due on your eligible Direct Loan
Program loans after you have made 120 payments on those loans (after October 1,
2007) under certain repayment plans while you are employed full-time in certain
public service jobs. The required 120 payments do not have to be consecutive.
Qualifying repayment plans include the REPAYE Plan, the PAYE Plan, the IBR
Plan, the ICR Plan, and the Standard Repayment Plan with a 10-year repayment
period.”
6) On page 9 of the MPN:
“PROMISE TO PAY
32

…
By signing this MPN, you … agree to repay in full all loans made under this MPN
according to the terms and conditions of the MPN.”
_________________________
The MPN makes no reference to Section 108 of the IRS Code, which
provides an exemption from inclusion in taxable income for student loan debt that
is forgiven under the PSLF program from being taxed as ordinary income. 45
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III.

THE AMOUNT OF DEBT LIKELY TO BE FORGIVEN UNDER THE
PSLF PROGRAM
There is unfortunately not adequate data available at this time to offer with

confidence precise estimates as to how many people will take advantage of the
generous PSLF debt forgiveness provisions each year once people begin qualifying
for debt forgiveness in October of 2017 after making regular repayments of Direct
Loans while having been employed by a qualifying public service organization for
at least 10 years.

Before the PSLF program was first established in 2007 the Congressional
Budget office estimated that if the proposed PSLF legislation was adopted “about
50,000 new borrowers each year would eventually be eligible for, and participate
in, income-contingent loan forgiveness each year” under this program. 46 However,
this early pre-enactment estimate was little more than a guess as to the eventual
extent of participation in the program. In hindsight, this number will likely prove
to be a significant underestimate of the extent of participation in this program,
given that over a half-million borrowers have obtained annual employment
certifications as of the end of 2016,47 with 218,223 new borrowers doing so in
2016 alone,48 even though such applications are not required,49 and given that it has
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been estimated that as many as one-quarter of the jobs in the economy qualify as
public service jobs under the program’s broad definition.50

There is also not adequate data available to precisely estimate the average
amount and the range in size of the debts that will be forgiven each year under the
PSLF program. The Congressional Budget Office annual participation estimate
noted above did not include any estimates as to the aggregate amount of debt that
would be forgiven each year. Many PSLF program participants will be persons
with only relatively modest undergraduate debts and no graduate school debt,51 and
will consequently likely have only relatively small amounts of debt remaining at
the time of their debt forgiveness. However, it has been estimated that because of
the substantial participation by high-debt graduate school borrowers who will
benefit significantly from the program the median debt load of program
participants could be over $60,000, and that upwards of 30% of program
participants could have debt loads over $100,000.52 In addition, 2014 data
revealed that at that time 80% of those Direct Loan borrowers who had received an
annual PSLF employment certification had loan debts of over $30,000, as
compared to only 36% of all Direct Loan borrowers.53
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Many law school and medical school graduates leave school with large sixfigure student debt loads,54 and if these lawyers and doctors take public service
jobs paying relatively modest salaries they often will experience significant
negative amortization of these debts over the following decade. Their monthly
loan repayments that they will make under either the PAYE plan or the post-2014
version of the Income-Based Repayment repayment plan, one of which is usually
selected by persons in this position, will be based in size upon their modest salaries
and will normally not be sufficient to cover even the interest owing on those large
loan debts, leading to negative amortization and rapid growth of their unpaid debt.
Many of these persons will consequently have accumulated debt of upwards of
$200,000 or more55 that will be forgiven after 10 years of qualifying employment.
Given these many large individual loan debts that will be forgiven the total amount
of debt that is discharged could easily impose a substantial annual cost upon the
U.S. Treasury amounting to billions of dollars.56

But precisely how many billions of dollars per year in costs to taxpayers is
unclear. What is known for certain is that at least 24.9 million and perhaps as
many as 31.9 million borrowers have taken out Direct Loans since October 1, 2007
that incorporate the current MPN provisions set forth above that relate in some
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fashion to the PSLF program,57 and that over half a million of these borrowers
have filed at least one of the voluntary PSLF program employment certification
forms with the DOE,58 and that roughly one-quarter of all jobs will qualify as
public service jobs.59 But since there is no requirement that people register in
some fashion for the PSLF program prior to eventually filing for debt forgiveness
when they become eligible to do so there is no solid basis for forecasting how
many borrowers will eventually apply, nor how large the aggregate amount of debt
forgiven will likely be. But given how attractive the debt forgiveness terms of the
PSLF program are, particularly for high-debt graduate school borrowers, and given
how broadly public service employment is defined for PSLF program purposes,
and given the fairly large and rapidly increasing number of annual employment
certification forms that have been filed to date, the amount of debt forgiven each
year under this program will eventually become quite substantial,60 likely large
enough to lead to political efforts to impose limitations upon or even curtailment of
the PSLF program.61

In order to make these impending financial consequences for taxpayers of
the PSLF program more clear let me engage in an illustrative but hopefully
realistic hypothetical calculation. Let me start by setting out some important
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baseline data. In 2015 a total of 143,276 new borrowers first received annual
employment certifications from the DOE,62 and in 2016 a total of 218,223 new
borrowers first received annual employment certifications.63 In 2014 the number
of Direct Loan borrowers increased by 2.3 million,64 in 2015 the number of Direct
Loan borrowers increased by 2.0 million,65 and in 2016 the number of Direct Loan
increased by 1.6 million.66 These figures together suggest that upwards of a couple
of hundred thousand people each year may enter the PSLF program loan
forgiveness 10-year “pipeline.”67 Another important statistic to consider is that
approximately 1.89 million Direct Loan borrowers both currently work in public
service positions and have enrolled in an income-based loan repayment plan, and
will consequently likely have unpaid loan debt after 10 years of public service.68
In the long-term steady-state one would expect about 10% of these 1.89 million
persons each year to meet the 10-year PSLF employment requirement,
approximately 189,000 people each year, with approximately that many newly
hired public service employees also entering the 10-year “pipeline” towards
eventual debt forgiveness eligibility.

On the basis of this data regarding the number of new Direct Loan borrowers
each year, the revealed extent of PSLF program interest through filings for annual
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employment certification, and the number of Direct Loan borrowers who both are
public service employees and are enrolled in income-based loan repayment
programs, I will (rather conservatively, I believe) project for the sake of this
illustration that the eventual “steady-state” number of persons who will annually
seek debt forgiveness under the PSLF program will be approximately 200,000.69

How much debt will be forgiven in total if this many people obtain
forgiveness each year? The median amount of Direct Loan debt for persons who
will later seek debt forgiveness under the PSLF program has been estimated at
slightly over $60,000.70 I will assume for this simple illustration that the average
amount of Direct Loan debt owed by these persons upon their enrollment in one or
another of the loan repayment plans is equal to this median debt estimate.71 Given
that most of those persons will have spent the next 10 years after leaving school
enrolled in either the PAYE plan or the post-2014 version of the Income-Based
Repayment plan. under either of which they will only have had to make loan
repayments equal to 10% of their disposable income,72 and given that the annual
income for most persons working in qualifying public service jobs will be
relatively modest, those loan repayments will on average barely be large enough to
cover the annual loan interest charges,73 leaving on average the entire debt
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principle unpaid at the time debt forgiveness is sought. Now with an assumed
200,000 people a year having an average of $60,000 each of loan debt forgiven,74
without tax consequences, that comes to $12 billion/year of forgiven loan debt,75
obviously a very substantial cost to the Treasury.

This estimate of the annual steady-state PSLF program costs to the Treasury,
strikingly large as it is, may well be too conservative. With approximately two
million new Direct Loan borrowers each year,76 and with one-quarter of all jobs
qualifying for the program, and with rapidly increasing rates of enrollment by
Direct Loan borrowers in income-based loan repayment plans in recent years, the
long-run steady-state rate of participation in this program, once it begins to widely
bestow its generous benefits and these benefits become more broadly publicized
and appreciated, could significantly exceed 200,000 persons/year, leading to even
higher costs for taxpayers. If, for example, 15% of each year’s approximately two
million Direct Loan borrowers later utilize the PSLF program (still significantly
less than the approximately 25% of jobs which qualify as public service jobs),77
that would lead to approximately 300,000 persons/year seeking debt forgiveness, 78
at a total annual cost of approximately $18 billion.79

40

I am certain that annual costs in the neighborhood of $12-18 billion will lead
to political efforts to statutorily curtail or eliminate the PSLF program, probably
calling for changes that will retroactively impact existing Direct Loan borrowers as
well as prospective future borrowers if this can be legally justified. These efforts
will be bolstered by those persons who are concerned by the highly skewed and
regressive nature of the program’s benefits in favor of high-debt law school and
medical school graduates that I have noted. Let me now turn to consider the
question of the legality of the retroactive application of such statutes to existing
Direct Loan borrowers were they to be adopted.
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IV.

BORROWER CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS TO INVOKE DEBT
FORGIVENESS AND TAX EXEMPTION OF FORGIVEN DEBT

The United States government is subject to the same obligation to perform
its contractual obligations as are private parties,80 except in those few instances
where special sovereign immunity defenses apply, which do not include ordinary
student loan transactions.81 The issue here is therefore whether the MPN
documentation that is now used for Direct Loan transactions contractually
obligates the government to provide borrowers with those PSLF program debt
forgiveness provisions and the related tax laws that existed when the contracts
were entered into, and if so whether these borrower contractual rights are subject to
abrogation by later-enacted changes in those laws.

Let me consider separately in this Part IV each of four different rationales
that can be offered in support of the argument that Direct Loan borrowers who
took out their loans after October 1, 2007 and prior to the effective date of any
legislative changes affecting the PSLF program or related tax laws have a
contractual right both to invoke the program’s debt forgiveness terms and avail
themselves of the debt forgiveness-related tax laws that were in force at the time
that they took out their loans. These four rationales are: 1) an argument based
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upon the express terms of the MPN, 2) an argument based upon the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 3) a promissory estoppel argument based
upon forseeable borrower reliance on being able to later invoke the PSLF program
debt forgiveness terms and the related tax laws that were in force at the time they
took out their loans, an 4) an argument based upon the unconscionability of those
MPN terms that might retroactively subject borrowers to later-enacted legislative
changes in the program. I will later in Part V start with the assumption that these
contractual rights can be established under one or more of these theories, and I will
then turn to consider whether the federal government could legally adopt statutes
abrogating one or both of these rights without being subject to Constitutional
limitations that would either bar such actions or require it to provide compensation
to those borrowers.

A. The Express Contractual Terms Argument.
The MPN on page 8 as noted above clearly states the terms of the debt
forgiveness rights that borrowers currently have under the PSLF program.
However, the MPN also appears to incorporate by reference later-enacted laws that
could retroactively curtail or even eliminate those borrower rights. For example,
on page 2 the MPN states that “the terms of this Master Promissory Note (MPN)
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will be interpreted in accordance with …any amendments to the HEA [in which
the PSLF program authorization is embedded] and the regulations in accordance
with the effective date of those amendments, and any other applicable federal laws
and regulations.” On page 4 the MPN then similarly states in bold font that “any
amendment to the Act [the HEA] that affects the terms of this MPN will be applied
to your loans in accordance with the effective date of the amendment.”

One could argue that this MPN language should be interpreted as only
justifying the incorporation of the terms of statutory amendments into new Direct
Loans that are taken out by borrowers after the effective date of those amendments,
and not into prior loans. However, this argument will face considerable
difficulties. The several references in the statutory incorporation language of the
MPN noted above to “this MPN”82 strongly suggests that later statutory
amendments to the Higher Education Act or its implementing regulations will also
apply to modify earlier Direct Loans as of the date of statutory enactment, even if
those statutes may have retroactive impacts on the rights and duties created under
those earlier loan agreements, although these references are not quite as clear in
this regard with respect to amendments to federal laws and regulations other than
the Higher Education Act, such as the tax laws. My conclusion here is that if one
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considers only the express terms of the MPN, and not any duties of good faith and
fair dealing that would be implied into the loan contracts to supplement those
express terms, nor any additional lender contractual duties that may be based upon
forseeable borrow reliance on the loan terms, nor any possible unconscionabilitybased reformation of the loan terms (which arguments are each discussed more
fully below), those MPN terms appear to not preclude retroactive application of
statutory amendments that would limit or even eliminate current PSLF program
debt forgiveness privileges or the current tax exemption of forgiven debt for Direct
Loan borrowers who took out those loans prior to the effective date of those
amendments.

In other words, under the express terms of the MPN these Direct Loan
borrowers would not have contractual rights that could not be unilaterally modified
or rescinded by the government by statute. Let me here note here that there is a
reasonable case to be made that the express terms of the MPN are not clear enough
to permit the retroactive imposition of statutory limitations of PSLF program debt
forgiveness rights or less favorable tax treatment of forgiven debt. That argument
has some plausibility and appeal, given the vagueness and generality of the
references to possible later-enacted statutes that are contained in the MPN. But in
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my opinion it is not likely to prevail.

The DOE in its 2008 regulations implementing the PSLF program rather
summarily took the position that the express terms of the MPN do not provide
Direct Loan borrowers with a contractual right to invoke the program’s debt
forgiveness terms.83 A later short 2016 study by the AccessLex Institute reached
the same conclusion.84 However, there are at least three other promising contract
law avenues to explore, one or more of which may suffice to establish contractual
borrower rights to debt forgiveness and favorable tax treatment thereof, at least for
a subset of Direct Loan borrowers if not all of them. None of these alternative
theories of contractual obligation appear to have been considered by either the
DOE or the AccessLex Institute. Let me turn to these alternative theories.

B. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Argument.
While as discussed above the express terms of the current MPN should and
would probably be interpreted to not impose any contractual obligation on the part
of the federal government to existing Direct Loan borrowers to continue to provide
them with the current PSLF program debt forgiveness benefits or their favorable
tax treatment if that program and/or the tax laws were legislatively amended to
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curtail these benefits, there is case law holding the government liable for breach of
contract even absent violation of any express contractual terms on the basis of the
imposition of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.85 In Centex v.
United States, for example, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that this
covenant was implied into governmental contracts with a private party, and that the
covenant imposed a duty upon the government “not to act so as to destroy the
reasonable expectations of the other party as to the fruits of the contract.”86

This implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing therefore imposes some
limits on the ability of the government to retroactively alter the terms of Direct
Loan agreements by statute. For example, consider the extreme situation of the
passage of a statute that unilaterally increased the fixed interest rate on previously
executed Direct Loans by a significant amount above the rate that the borrowers
had agreed to. While such a statute would technically conform to the express MPN
terms that arguably allow without restriction statutory changes with retroactive
impacts on loan terms, such an attempt by the government to unilaterally impose a
much higher interest rate on prior borrowers than what was originally agreed to
would surely be regarded by the courts as contrary to the reasonable expectations
of typical borrowers that their interest payment obligations under a nominally fixed
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interest rate loan agreement would remain unchanged for the term of the loan. It
would therefore be in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Another way to state this conclusion would be to say that the borrowers
have an implied contractual right to be charged no more than the originally agreed
interest rate.

In a similar fashion, for those many borrowers who have large student loans
and who later take relatively low-paying qualifying public service jobs,87 such as
many law school and medical school graduates, either the termination of the PSLF
program debt forgiveness privileges or the elimination of the tax exemption for
forgiven debt under this program would have severe adverse financial
consequences that would be economically equivalent to a rather large unilateral
increase in their fixed interest payment obligations.88 Such statutes should arguably
be judicially regarded in a similar manner as being a violation of the borrowers’
contractual rights created by that implied covenant.

Despite the express MPN language that is arguably sufficient to allow
retroactive incorporation of later legislative enactments that curtail debt
forgiveness rights or tax law rights into the Direct Loan agreements, the reality
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here is that the typical student loan borrower does not (and probably could not)
give the fine print of the extensive and detailed MPN loan documentation such a
close, lawyerly reading that would reveal such risks. The typical Direct Loan
borrower is young and financially relatively inexperienced, and gives that detailed
loan documentation only a cursory reading at best before signing it. Those typical
borrowers would generally expect (and would arguably be reasonable in doing so)
that not only would their initial fixed interest payment obligations remain
unchanged, but that they would also to be able to later avail themselves of the
PSLF program’s debt forgiveness terms and the relevant tax law provisions that
existed at the time of their loan, given that the substantial curtailment or
elimination of those debt forgiveness terms or tax benefits would be just as
devastating to them as would be a large unilateral interest rate increase. They
might understand that later-enacted statutes could impact their subsequent
disclosure or other technical regulatory compliance obligations in some fashion,
perhaps significantly increasing their burdens in these regards, but they would
probably not anticipate that statutory changes might be retroactively imposed on
their loan agreements that would radically and adversely alter its basic financial
parameters.
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Now one should recognize that it is possible that a court that was trying to
determine whether Direct Loan borrowers had contractual rights to debt
forgiveness and the current tax benefits for forgiven debt under this implied
covenant, in the face of an attempted statutory curtailment of those privileges,
might elect to apply the “reasonable expectations” criterion under this implied
covenant to the particular litigants before it in a fact-specific manner rather than in
an more conventional “objective” manner based on hypothetical average
contracting party characteristics, even though the latter approach is quite
commonly used in many contexts for legal assessment of the “reasonableness” of
particular conduct. Rather than postulating a hypothetical Direct Loan borrower of
average awareness of and expectations regarding the fine-print loan terms whose
reasonable expectations were to be protected, and then determining whether that
hypothetical person had a reasonable expectation of debt forgiveness and favorable
tax treatment that merited protection through declaration of contractual rights, the
court may require the litigant before it to provide sufficient evidence that he or she
did in fact have reasonable expectations of having a contractual right to debt
forgiveness, and of a right to the current favorable tax treatment thereof.

Under this judicial approach any litigants who would be asserting that they
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had both of these contractual rights under the MPN’s implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing would have the considerable burden of having to provide
sufficient evidence to establish a favorable position on each of six legal issues: 1)
whether they were aware of the PSLF program debt forgiveness terms set forth in
the MPN when they executed their loan documents, 2) if so, whether they expected
that their rights to utilize those debt forgiveness terms would survive a later
legislative amendment that would attempt to curtail those rights, and if so, 3)
whether, given their particular degree of legal sophistication, such expectations
were reasonable, 4) whether they were aware of the favorable tax treatment that
debt forgiven under the PSLF program was accorded when the executed their loan
documents, 5) if so, whether they expected that their rights to invoke those tax
benefits would survive a later legislative amendment that would attempt to curtail
those rights, and if so, 6) whether, given their particular degree of legal
sophistication, such expectations of contractual tax benefits immune to statutory
abridgement were reasonable.

Under such a fact-specific “reasonable expectations” inquiry only those
persons who could satisfy the first three issues noted above by providing sufficient
evidence that they were aware of the current PSLF program debt forgiveness
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benefits, and that they reasonably expected those benefits to be contractual rights
that they held, would be accorded a contractual right to those benefits. In similar
fashion, only those persons who could satisfy the second three issues noted above
by providing sufficient evidence that they were aware of the current favorable tax
treatment of debt forgiven under the PSLF programs, and that they reasonably
expected those tax terms to be contractual rights that they held, would be accorded
a contractual right to that tax treatment.

A judicial requirement that such fact-specific showings be made would be
devastating to the implied covenant argument for establishing contractual rights.
These fact-specific showings with regard to each of perhaps numerous loan
transactions taking place as long as 10 years earlier could be made by at most only
a very small proportion of Direct Loan borrowers. This requirement would as a
practical matter be tantamount to rejecting the argument that these two contractual
rights exist on the basis of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

However, given the clear advantages of judicial economy of reaching a
single blanket ruling on this question of the existence of implied covenant-based
contractual rights that would apply equally to all Direct Loan borrowers, and that
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would avoid the need for a great deal of fact-specific litigation, a court may well be
willing to make this “reasonable expectations” determination on “objective”
criteria; i.e., on the basis of the presumed knowledge and expectations of a
hypothetical “average” Direct Loan borrower. If so, that court may well conclude
that this hypothetical borrower had awareness of and expectations regarding being
able to invoke the PSLF program’s debt forgiveness terms, and that these
expectations were reasonable and therefore create contractual rights under the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

This “objective reasonable expectations” argument would be less powerful
with regard to establishing a contractual right that would preclude the retroactive
application of a change in the IRS Code that would limit or eliminate the favorable
tax treatment of forgiven debt under the PSLF program. The MPN which refers
explicitly to the PSLF program’s debt forgiveness benefits, but makes no explicit
reference to the favorable tax treatment of that forgiven debt that would make
borrowers aware of those tax benefits, or that would encourage borrower
expectations that those tax benefits would remain available years later at the time
of debt forgiveness. In addition, given the general broad judicial acceptance (and
reasonably wide public recognition) of the view that amendments to the IRS Code
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that have adverse retroactive effects upon particular taxpayers are nevertheless
permitted,89 an argument can be made that any such expectations that the relevant
tax laws will remain unchanged are unreasonable.

C. The Promissory Estoppel Argument.
The essence of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
“reasonable expectations” argument set forth above can presented in a related but
slightly different guise if this implied covenant is determined to not be broad
enough in this context to provide contractual debt forgiveness rights and the right
to the current tax treatment of such forgiven debts, at least for those Direct Loan
borrowers who cannot make the required fact-specific showings, if not all
borrowers. Another legal doctrine which may provide some contractual protection
for these borrower expectations is the broadly accepted doctrine of promissory
estoppel.90

Under the promissory estoppel principle, if the government should
“reasonably expect” that a Direct Loan borrower would rely upon a promise as to
the later availability of the current PSLF program debt forgiveness terms and their
tax treatment, and the borrower then does so rely in taking out the loan, or in later
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accepting public service employment, then the government will have to recognize
that the borrower has a contractual right to invoke those terms “to the extent justice
requires.”91 The focus of the inquiry here would be whether the government should
reasonably expect borrower reliance upon the later availability of those terms,
rather than upon the reasonableness of those borrowers’ expectations in relying
upon those terms which would be the focus of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing inquiry discussed above. If it is determined that the government
should reasonably expect borrower reliance (whether or not the borrowers have
behaved reasonably in so relying), then the final issue presented would then be
whether the demands of justice would then call for contractual enforcement of
those debt forgiveness and tax treatment terms, in whole or in part. The
reasonableness of the borrower’s reliance could, however, be a relevant factor in
this final determination as to what resolution of the question best furthers justice.

The principles of promissory estoppel apply to impose contractual
obligations upon the federal government in the same manner as they apply to
private parties.92 There is a distinction drawn in the law when a party seeks to
utilize the earlier and related doctrine of equitable estoppel to bind the government
to fraudulent or mistaken representations of its agents. The courts under such
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circumstances will not hold the government liable for those representations unless
the agent was acting within the scope of their authority.93 However, when a
promissory estoppel claim is made based upon the authorized promissory
representations of a government agent, the same rules are applied as are to private
parties under such circumstances.

This promissory estoppel argument for holding the government contractually
obligated to allow borrowers PSLF program debt forgiveness and the favorable tax
treatment of forgiven debt is interesting, but there are several plausible counterarguments that can be made against this basis for establishing these contractual
rights. One straightforward counter-argument would be that the express terms of
the MPN simply do not promise that the PSLF program’s debt forgiveness terms
will remain available indefinitely for borrower invocation, nor do they include any
specific reference to restrictions on changes in the tax treatment of forgiven debt.
Those MPN terms instead make it reasonably clear to a legally sophisticated reader
that later legislative enactments may retroactively limit or even eliminate these
debt forgiveness and tax treatment privileges. If no promises at all were made to
borrowers this would sharply undercut the promissory estoppel rationale for
imposing contractual obligations upon the government.
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A second, related counter-argument would be that any promises that may
have been made in the MPN as to the future availability of current PSLF program
debt forgiveness terms or favorable tax treatment have been expressly made
subject to later legislative enactments. Now it may be reasonable for the
government to expect typical student loan borrowers without legal training to
overlook the hedged nature of these conditional promises, assuming that they are
promises at all, and to rely upon them as though they were unconditional
commitments. However, borrower reliance on the mere hope that the PSLF
program debt forgiveness terms and the tax laws applicable to forgiven debt will
remain unchanged, despite the MPN’s express references to possible later limiting
enactments, is therefore unreasonable. Achieving justice arguably does not require
the courts to order the government to meet people’s unreasonable contractual
expectations.

Finally, the promissory estoppel argument raises the subsidiary question of
whether to prevail with this argument a particular Direct Loan borrower should
have to show by substantial evidence that they actually relied upon having the
opportunity to later avail themselves of the PSLF debt forgiveness terms and their
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favorable tax treatment at the time when they entered into their loan agreements, or
when they later took a public service position, or whether such reliance will be
presumed as a matter of law on the basis of “objective” criteria; i.e., an analysis of
whether a hypothetical “average” Direct Loan borrower would have so relied. If a
borrower must demonstrate actual reliance on these presumed MPN promises to be
able invoke a promissory estoppel-based contractual right to debt forgiveness and
favorable tax treatment thereof, this would obviously bar most if not virtually all
borrowers from a favorable finding, in a fashion similar to what I have shown
regarding what a fact-specific showing requirement would do to hinder the implied
covenant theory of contractual obligation.

D. The Unconscionability Argument.
Finally, even if the MPN terms are interpreted to permit the government to
subject borrowers to later-enacted legislation that would significantly alter their
PSLF program debt forgiveness and favorable tax law treatment privileges, even
after considering the implied covenant and promissory estoppel theories of
contractual obligation discussed above, a final argument can be made that such
alterations should not be allowed because they are so unfair and surprising to
borrowers as to be unconscionable.94 This unconscionability argument would be
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based upon the claim that the express MPN provisions that allow for retroactive
legislative alterations of loan terms and tax treatment present both significant
procedural and substantive unfairness, satisfying the usual judicial requirements
that both forms of unfairness be present to some significant extent to justify
judicial abrogation of those provisions on unconscionability grounds.95 If a court
accepted this argument it could then reform the loan agreements by refusing to
enforce those particular MPN provisions that allow for subsequent unilateral
government amendment by statute, thus giving borrowers in effect a contractual
right to PSLF program debt forgiveness and the favorable tax treatment thereof.

The procedural unfairness argument that could be made here would be that
the terse and legalistic MPN provisions relating to the possibility of alteration of
the loan terms by subsequent legislation do not clearly reveal to typical Direct
Loan borrowers, who in general have not had any formal legal training, the
dramatic nature of the increased burden that could later be legislatively imposed on
them by the elimination of their debt forgiveness and favorable tax treatment
rights. This argument would once again present the related sub-issue as to whether
a fact-specific showing here will be required by courts. Will those borrowers who
cannot demonstrate that they were unaware of the possibility of such retroactive
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legislation at the time they took out their loans be regarded differently and less
favorably than those less sophisticated borrowers who can somehow demonstrate
that they were not consciously aware of this risk?

A class action challenge to a later-enacted statute that curtailed debt
forgiveness rights that was mounted based on this contractual theory of
reformation due to unconscionability grounds may be required by the court to
bifurcate the plaintiff class with regard to this particular issue. Once again, if
courts required that borrowers be able to provide sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that they were unaware at the time of contract formation of the
existence and significance of the MPN terms that make borrower privileges
conditional with regard to later statutory amendments, this would be quite
burdensome and would likely defeat most if not virtually all borrower claims.
However, once again considerations of judicial economy might cause courts to
instead apply their determination of the extent of knowledge and understanding of
a hypothetical “average” Direct Loan borrower for all such unconscionability
claims.

The substantive unfairness argument would focus on the major financial
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implications of the loss of those debt forgiveness and tax treatment privileges for
borrowers, as compared to the size of the loan obligations they have originally
undertaken. This argument may also present a related sub-issue: Should those
high-debt borrowers, such as law school and medical school graduates, who will
suffer greatly from the loss of debt forgiveness privileges be treated differently
from those many borrowers who have more modest loan balances, and who
therefore will not be as strongly impacted? This difference in the significance of
losing these privileges between these borrower groups may also call for partition of
an unconscionability class action into two (or more) different lawsuits on this
particular issue.
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V.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POWER TO RETROACTIVELY LIMIT
PSLF DEBT FORGIVENESS AND TAX TREATMENT PRIVILEGES
If it is determined that current Direct Loan borrowers do not have

contractual rights to later avail themselves of the PSLF program debt forgiveness
privilege or current tax law treatment there do not appear to be any Constitutional
limitations that would be sufficient to bar enforcement of a federal statute that
would retroactively terminate that privilege. However, if the program’s debt
forgiveness terms were left in force but the tax exemption now given to that
forgiven debt was statutorily eliminated, there is some question as to whether such
legislation would pass Constitutional due process scrutiny, although I believe that
it would.

The courts have long permitted tax legislation that has retroactive impacts on
some taxpayers.96 As early as 1880 it was established that taxation for a public
purpose is not a taking of private property in violation of the Takings Clause of the
Constitution.97 In addition, a taxpayer’s mere reliance upon an existing tax
provision remaining in force is insufficient to establish that a tax law change is a
Constitutional violation.98 However, upon occasion a tax law change with
retroactive impact has been challenged as a violation of the substantive due process
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requirements of the Constitution on the basis that the length of the period of
retroactivity reaching back from the date of statutory enactment is excessive.

Now most tax legislation is made retroactive only to the beginning of the
year of enactment, and such legislation has been routinely upheld against such
substantive due process challenges.99 However, tax laws that reach back further
than one year to impose changes in the tax treatment of prior events are on rare
occasions successfully challenged on substantive due process grounds. For
example, in Nichols v. Coolidge the Supreme Court disallowed the retroactive
application of an estate tax provision that changed the tax treatment of a property
transfer that had taken place 12 years earlier.100 In a later case the Supreme Court
endorsed this ruling and contrasted it with the different result reached in many
other instances where the “retroactive effect is limited.”101

A change in the tax laws governing debt forgiven under the PSLF program
would potentially have retroactive effects for some borrowers going as far back as
1994 when the Direct Loan program first went into effect,102 thus far exceeding the
12 years of retroactive application found to be unacceptable in Nichols v.
Coolidge. This potentially long period of retroactivity exists because while a

63

borrower must have worked for 10 years in qualifying public service after October
1, 2007 to obtain debt forgiveness, if the borrower meets that requirement he will
be able to have any remaining balance on any Direct Loans forgiven, even if some
or all of those loans were taken out prior to October 1, 2007. Now as a practical
matter the large majority of Direct Loans that will be forgiven under the PSLF
program, starting in October of 2017, will be post-2007 loans that the borrower
will have taken out within 10 years or less of the time of seeking debt forgiveness.
However, there will likely also be some Direct Loans that were taken out more
than 10 years before PSLF program debt forgiveness is sought, and that were then
partially repaid under extended 20- or 25-year income-based loan repayment plans
and will not have been fully repaid by the time PSLF program debt forgiveness is
sought. So a tax law change here could conceivably have retroactive impact for a
particular taxpayer extending back before 2007 and perhaps all the way back to
1994!

However, it was not until the PSLF program was adopted in 2007 that a
Direct Loan borrower could have formed an expectation of PSLF program debt
forgiveness and the tax exemption of this forgiven debt, so perhaps it would be
more appropriate to regard the period of retroactive impact of a tax law change as
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extending back only to October 1, 2007 when those expectations of debt
forgiveness and favorable tax treatment could have first arisen, even if some of the
loan debts that would later be forgiven were incurred well prior to that date. Still,
even if framed in this manner such a statute would be imposing a retroactive period
of up to at least 10 years in length – longer for some borrowers if the hypothetical
new tax law is adopted after 2017 -- and therefore would perhaps be open to
challenge on substantive due process grounds under the rationale of Nichols v.
Coolidge which as noted invalidated a tax law that had a retroactive impact
extending back 12 years. But I doubt that such an argument would prove
successful, given the broad judicial support for retroactive tax laws,103 and given
the very large revenue consequences of invalidating such a statute, which I have
estimated earlier would recapture one-quarter to one-third of the $12 billion to $18
billion/year of forgiven debt. .

For the remainder of this Part V I will assume for the sake of argument that
it has been determined that under one or more of the legal theories discussed above
at least some Direct Loan borrowers do have a contractual right to utilize the
current PSLF program debt forgiveness rights, and a contractual right to the current
favorable tax treatment of any debt forgiven. Does the contractual status of those
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borrowers’ rights affect the federal government’s ability to retroactively terminate
one or both of those rights under the Constitution without providing compensation
to the adversely affected borrowers? My conclusion here is that these contractual
rights would each be regarded as “private property” and protected against
retroactive statutory elimination by the Takings Clause of the Constitution.104

Let me explain my reasoning. The U.S. Constitution’s Contracts Clause
prohibits any state government from adopting a law that would impair its
contractual obligations,105 but it has long been recognized that this provision
applies only to the states and not to the federal government.106 Any Constitutional
challenge to federal statutes that impair the contractual rights of a private party in a
contract with the federal government, such as the assumed contractual rights of
Direct Loan borrowers to utilize PSLF program debt forgiveness terms and to have
favorable tax treatment of the forgiven debt, would have to be based on the
argument that the statutes violate the Takings Clause of the Constitution which
prohibits the taking of private property without providing just compensation.107

Contract rights are generally deemed to constitute “private property” as that
phrase is used in the Takings Clause,108 but there are important exceptions made to
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this general rule. For example, in Bowen v. POSSE109 the U.S. Supreme Court
stated in sweeping terms that contractual arrangements, including those to which a
sovereign itself is party, remain subject to subsequent legislation,110 and held that
the contractual right of the State of California to terminate its participation in the
Social Security system did not constitute a property right within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment,111 but that such a right remained “subject to the sovereign’s
jurisdiction, and [that jurisdiction] will remain intact unless surrendered in
unmistakable terms.”112 The Bowen court distinguished this lesser right from the
hardier property rights that would be created by a contractual debt of the
government, or by a government obligation to otherwise provide benefits under a
contract.113

Under the reasoning of the Bowen case, if the Direct Loan borrowers are
determined to have a contractual right to invoke PSLF program debt forgiveness,
as I am assuming here, this right would appear to be of the nature of a
governmental obligation to provide benefits, and where the government’s right to
unilaterally alter or terminate those benefits has been “surrendered in unmistakable
terms.” That right would therefore deserve the usual “private property right”
Takings Clause Constitutional protection that would bar its termination by statute
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without the government providing compensation. In similar fashion, if these
Direct Loan borrowers are determined to also have a contractual right to the
currently favorable tax exemption for forgiven debt, under Bowen this right would
also appear to be of the nature of a government obligation to provide benefits that
merited such Constitutional Takings Clause protection. The retroactive taxation
jurisprudence briefly discussed above that broadly allows the adoption of tax laws
with retroactive impact (if the period of retroactivity is not excessively long) does
not appear to be here applicable because those prior cases allowing for retroactive
measures do not address the unusual circumstances assumed to be present where
the government has specifically contracted to provide a certain tax treatment for a
transaction.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

As I have discussed above, I believe that the express language of the MPN
should be interpreted to allow the government to retroactively impose statutory
limitation or even elimination of PSLF program debt forgiveness privileges for
prior Direct Loan borrowers,114 and to retroactively change the tax laws applicable
to any forgiven debt. Direct Loan borrowers do not appear to have an express
contractual right to either debt forgiveness or favorable tax treatment of forgiven
debt.

Under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, a fairly
strong case can be made that Direct Loan borrowers have an implied contractual
right to debt forgiveness under the PSLF program and to the current favorable tax
treatment of debt so forgiven, if not all borrowers then at least those few borrowers
who can demonstrate that they reasonably expected to have such contractual rights
when they entered into their loan agreements.

In addition, a related but distinct argument can be made that the government
should be bound by promissory estoppel principles to contractual commitments to
honor those debt forgiveness and tax treatment privileges originally articulated in
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the Direct Loan documentation, again if not for all borrowers then at least with
regard to those few borrowers who can demonstrate that they actually relied upon
later having those rights at the time when they entered into their loan agreements,
or when they later took public service employment. However, as I have noted
there are several strong counter-arguments that can be made against imposing
contractual liability on the government here on a promissory estoppel theory.

Finally, a robust unconscionability challenge can be mounted against
enforcement of the MPN terms that allow for retroactive elimination PSLF
program debt forgiveness privileges for Direct Loan borrowers by later-enacted
statutes, seeking reformation of those contracts to provide contractual protection to
borrowers against such statutes, if not for all borrowers than certainly at least with
regard to those high-debt borrowers who can demonstrate that they were both
unaware of this possibility at the time of contracting and would be severely
impacted by the loss or substantial curtailment of their debt forgiveness rights.

In summary, I think that it is an open question whether the courts would
regard the PSLF program debt forgiveness terms as a contractual obligation of the
government under the post-October 1, 2007 Direct Loan agreements, rather than as
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merely a revocable privilege, under one or more of the above contractual theories
of liability if this matter were litigated in the context of retroactive statutory
curtailment or elimination of those privileges. I have here considered several
arguments that could be made in this regard, and while some of them have
considerable merit at least for a small subset of Direct Loan borrowers the proper
resolution of the question as a matter of positive law is unclear. For the reasons
that I have discussed, however, I think that it is much less likely that the courts
would regard the privilege of favorable tax treatment of debt forgiven under the
PSLF program as a contractual obligation of the government.

If one assumes for the sake of argument that the existence of borrower
contractual rights to both debt forgiveness and favorable tax treatment can be
justified by one or more of the above theories, that raises the difficult question as
to whether the federal government then still has the power under the Constitution
to retroactively abrogate one or both of those contractual rights by statute. I have
concluded that a strong case can be made that if borrowers have contractual rights
to debt forgiveness these rights should be regarded as property rights that under the
Takings Clause cannot be retroactively abrogated without the payment of
compensation. I have also concluded that if borrowers have a contractual right to
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the current favorable tax treatment of forgiven debt this right should also be
regarded as a property right that similarly under the Takings Clause cannot be
retroactively abrogated without the payment of compensation.

The Obama Administration’s 2016 proposal to limit PSLF program debt
forgiveness eligibility was not adopted, and the recent Trump Administration
proposal to prospectively abolish the PSLF program altogether for most Direct
Loans taken out as of July 1, 2018115 may or may not be adopted. But in any
event, given the very large annual costs that the debt forgiveness provisions of this
program are likely to impose upon the Treasury in later years once substantial
numbers of people begin to obtain debt forgiveness, and given the highly skewed
regressive distribution of the benefits of the program’s debt forgiveness terms in
favor of mid-career lawyers and doctors, there are likely to be later attempts made
to statutorily curtail or eliminate this program, or to reduce or eliminate its
favorable tax benefits, in a manner that will have retroactive impacts upon prior
Direct Loan borrowers.

Finally, if such statutes with retroactive impacts are adopted there will surely
be court challenges to those statutes asserted along the lines of the arguments that I
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have outlined above. Such challenges will present not only difficult legal issues
but also hard policy questions as to how to best balance the widespread reliance by
existing Direct Loan borrowers on being able to later avail themselves of the PSLF
program debt forgiveness terms against the legitimate public concerns regarding
the large costs and the somewhat regressive incidence of the program’s benefits.

I do not have strong feelings or any special insights as to how this tension
should be resolved. I do suggest for discussion one possible compromise
approach. Congress could adopt a statute which continues unchanged the PSLF
program’s debt forgiveness eligibility and benefits, but which would treat debts
forgiven under the PSLF program as taxable income as is now done for the other
federal income-based loan repayment programs. Such a statute would immediately
recapture approximately one-quarter to one-third of the debt forgiveness benefits in
new income tax revenues, and would do so in a modestly progressive manner as it
imposed larger taxes on higher-debt (and presumably also higher-earning) lawyers
and doctors. This approach would, however, create a troubling “tax bomb” effect
in that persons would now be burdened with what in some instances would be a
very substantial income tax obligation without being provided with any funds to
pay those taxes.116 For the typical undergraduate borrower with a $30,000 initial
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loan debt that as I have discussed earlier would have approximately $25,000 of
debt forgiven,117 this would impose a tax liability of approximately $6,000 to
$8,000, a significant but not a crushing financial obligation. For lawyers or
doctors with upwards of $200,000 of debt forgiven,118 however, their tax bill could
be as high as $50,000 to $70,000 or more, which may well be beyond some
persons’ capacity to pay.

In my earlier analysis of the comparable tax bomb impacts for high-debt law
school graduates of large forgiven debts of $200,000 or more being treated as
taxable income under the PAYE and Income-Based Repayment plans after either
20 or 25 years, I suggested that the Code should be perhaps be revised to give these
persons several years to pay these taxes, with only a modest interest rate imposed
for the privilege of making deferred payments, rather than requiring that the taxes
all be paid in the year of discharge.119 The argument for a comparable deferred
payment provision to be included in any repeal of the PSLF program debt
forgiveness tax exemption is even stronger, given that these persons will generally
have had only about 10 years to set aside funds in anticipation of these taxes, and
moreover they would have had to do so out of relatively modest public service
salaries, rather than having 20 or 25 years to build up a dedicated fund out of often
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larger private sector incomes to pay these taxes, as they have for the other incomebased repayment plans. Another possible mitigating statutory option here would
be to allow those persons who have debts forgiven under the PSLF program to
elect to pay those taxes over time in accordance with the terms of their prior loan
repayment program, thereby giving them another 10 to 15 years or so to repay that
tax debt at the original student loan interest rate. This approach of meshing the tax
burden with the terms of their prior loan agreement would be equivalent to
forgiving two-thirds to three-quarters of their loan debt without imposing any tax
obligation at all, and then requiring repayment of the balance of the debt on the
same terms as before. There would therefore be no “tax bomb;” no specific tax
imposed in the year in which the remaining debts are (partially) forgiven. The
borrower would then continue to make now much smaller loan repayments for
another 10 to 15 years until any remaining debt is then forgiven, and then that
forgiven debt would treated as taxable income in that year of final forgiveness as
the tax laws now require.

There are of course numerous other possible compromises that one can
envision to balance these competing legitimate interests of Direct Loan borrowers
who have relied upon eventual debt forgiveness with the interests of the general
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taxpaying public. Whatever the resolution here, the sooner that these questions are
resolved the better for all concerned, given the virtual flood of applications for debt
forgiveness under the PSLF program that is almost upon us.
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et al (2015)”).
27 Many law students will graduate with well over $150,000 of combined law school and
undergraduate student loan debt. For extended discussion of the magnitude of law school
graduate debt loads see generally Crespi (2014), supra n. 17; Crespi (2016), supra n. 17, Crespi
(2017), supra n. 17.
28 One might think that most doctors would earn substantial enough incomes during their first
10 years of medical practice that even payments of only 10% of their discretionary income as
required under the PAYE or IBR plans would fully repay even quite substantial medical school
loan debts before those persons qualified for debt forgiveness under the PSLF program.
However, many doctors will spend four years in residency at a relatively low salary at a hospital
which qualifies as a public service employer, and then will serve up to another three years in a
similarly low-paying qualifying internship. In that event, even after several later years of their
making more substantial loan repayments out of a much larger income they would often still
have substantial amounts of debt remaining to be forgiven under the program.
29 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the combination of capping the amount
of debt that could be forgiven under the PSLF program to $57,000 – as the Obama
Administration proposed in 2014 – and eliminating the current cap on required monthly
repayments to the amount owing under standard 10-year loan repayment terms – also
recommended in 2014 by the Obama Administration – would save the government
approximately $12.1 billion over the 2015-2024 10-year period, approximately $1.2 billion per
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year. Delisle (2016), supra n. 24, at 3. The savings would obviously be larger if the program
were eliminated altogether.
30 Consider the circumstances of a typical person who graduates from an undergraduate program
with the average $30,000 of Direct Loan debt, at a typical 5% overall annual interest rate, and
has a spouse and child, and then takes a qualifying public service position with a $45,000 starting
salary, and then enrolls in the PAYE loan repayment plan. Under that plan this person will be
required to make annual repayments of only 10% of the difference between their adjusted gross
income and 150% of the poverty level wage for a person with a family of that size. For that
person their annual payment obligation would be approximately ($45,000 -$30,000) x 10% =
$1,500 per year. This would be just enough to meet the annual interest payments on their loan
debt of $30,000 x 5% = $1,500. In succeeding years, with modest annual raises and
corresponding modest increases in their annual payment obligations under the PAYE plan, that
person would begin to amortize their principal debt, but only by a few hundred dollars per year.
After 10 years that person would still have on the order of $25,000 or so of debt to be forgiven.
For an extended discussion of the financial details of the various federal income-based loan
repayment plans, and of the tax consequences for borrowers of utilizing one of those plans
without obtaining PSLF program loan forgiveness, see generally Crespi (2014), supra n. 17.
The PSLF program is specifically addressed in that article at pages 99-101. For further
discussion of the taxation issues raised by these income-based loan repayment programs, and
discussion of the impacts Revised Pay As You Earn plan, the newest addition to the menu of
subsidized loan repayment options, upon law school graduates, see also Crespi (2016), supra n.
17, Crespi (2017), supra n. 17.
31 If one annualizes the benefits of $25,000 in forgiven debt after 10 years over a 10-year period
at a 5% annual discount rate, this comes to approximately $1,987/year. Assuming that the
typical public service worker is in a 25% combined marginal federal and state income tax
bracket, this would be equivalent to approximately $1,987 x 1.33 = $2,642/year in additional
before-tax income.
32 $2,642/$45,000 = 0.0587. See supra n. 30.
33 Consider the circumstances of a typical person who graduates from law school with a
combined undergraduate and law school Direct Loan debt load of $150,000, at a typical 6%
overall annual interest rate that reflects the higher rate charged graduate school borrowers
compared to undergraduates. Assume again that this person also has a spouse and child, and
then takes a qualifying public service position as an attorney with a $55,000 starting salary, and
then enrolls in the PAYE loan repayment plan. Under that plan this person will be required to
make annual repayments of only 10% of the difference between their adjusted gross income and
150% of the poverty level wage for a person with a family of that size. For that person their
annual payment obligation would be approximately ($55,000 -$30,000) x 10% = $2,500 per
year. This would be far short of the amount needed just enough to meet the annual interest
payments on their loan debt of $150,000 x 6% = $9,000. Their debt would therefore increase by
$9,000 - $2,500 = $6,500 that first year. In succeeding years, with modest annual raises and
corresponding modest increases in their annual payment obligations under the PAYE plan, the
amount of unpaid interest that would accrue would gradually reduce, but the negative

81

amortization would likely persist for the entire 10 year period, leading to a total principal plus
accrued interest debt of over $200,000 at the time of debt forgiveness.
For an extended discussion of the financial details of the various federal income-based loan
repayment plans, and of the tax consequences for borrowers of utilizing one of those plans
without obtaining PSLF program loan forgiveness, see also Crespi (2014), supra n. 17, Crespi
(2017), supra n. 17.
34 $200,000 of forgiven debt is eight times as large as the $25,000 of forgiven debt for a typical
undergraduate borrower, see supra n. 30. If one annualizes the benefits of $200,000 in forgiven
debt after 10 years over a 10-year period at a 5% annual discount rate, this comes to
approximately $15,896/year. Assuming that the typical law public service worker is also in a
25% combined marginal federal and state income tax bracket, this would be equivalent to
approximately $15,896 x 1.33 = $21,142/year in additional before-tax income.
35 $21,142/$55,000 = 0.3844. See supra n. 33.
36 This medical school graduate with similar initial debt and family circumstances will be in
essentially the same position as the law school; graduate discussed above, supra n. 33, except for
the fact that they would be likely to receive a substantial salary increase after completion of their
internship for the last three years of their 10-year public service period, perhaps even enough to
repay some of the accrued interest from the seven years of pronounced negative amortization.
37 Jason Delisle argues that the fact that the PSLF program will disproportionately benefit highdebt graduate school borrowers is not only improperly regressive in its incidence but will also
distort incentives to attend graduate school and encourage graduate schools to raise their tuitions.
See Deslisle (2016), supra n. 24, at 6-7. There has also been criticism of law schools
encouraging their students to later to utilize the PSLF program as an indirect means of making
those students less resistant to tuition increases. See Student Loan Planner LLC, “Georgetown
Law School PSLF Abuse Shows Why Program Will End” (Dec. 19, 2016), available at
https://www.studentloanplanner.com/georgetown-law-school-pslf-abuse/.
On the other hand, law school graduates and doctors who enter public service positions rather
than take private sector positions will on average make much larger financial sacrifices than will
persons who enter public service with only undergraduate degrees, both in absolute dollar terms
and in terms of the proportion of their alternative private sector salary forgone. Given this fact, a
significantly larger financial inducement may be necessary to adequately encourage lawyers and
doctors to enter public service than to induce persons with only undergraduate degrees to do so.
This need for providing a stronger financial inducement for persons with financially more
attractive alternatives to public service may justify the conceded regressivity and perverse
incentive impacts upon borrows and graduate schools of the way that the debt forgiveness
benefits of the PSLF program are allocated. There is room for reasonable disagreement here.
38 An even more difficult question is posed by Direct Loans taken out after 1994 and before
October 1, 2007. Those Direct Loans may be forgiven under the terms of the PSLF program, but
there is no reference made in the MPN that was executed for those loans to the PSLF program
since that program had not yet been enacted. Whether these loans would provide borrowers with
contractual protection against subsequent legislation curtailing PSLF program debt forgiveness
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rights to the same extent as would post-October 1, 2007 Direct Loans that reference the PSLF
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granted, id. at 24, and the remainder were denied either because the employer did not qualify, the
loans involved were not eligible for forgiveness, or there was missing and/or incorrect
information on the application. Id. at 25.
50 Delisle (2016), supra n. 24, at 2.
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